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ARTICLES
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990
Paul S. Edelman*
In response to several major oil spills, including the
Exxon Valdez incident in 1989, the Oil Pollution Act of
1990 (OPA) was signed into law. The author reviews re-
sponses to various oil spills, and the inadequacy of legis-
lation applicable to such responses prior to the OPA.
This article reviews various sections of the OPA and the
breadth of its coverage. The author points out that this
new legislation expands liability with respect to oil
spills, providing an incentive to potentially responsible
tanker owners to take stronger measures to avoid such
spills. However, as the author explains, the OPA may
create as many problems as it solves. For example, insur-
ers may have to provide new insurance coverage due to
larger exposure under the OPA, or even stop providing
such insurance altogether. The OPA requires that barges
be double hulled, which is extremely costly to install and
may be the cause of more explosions or extensive leaks
than single hulls. The author also opines that the in-
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creased liability under the OPA may deter foreign oil im-
porters from using the ports of the United States.
Since the Exxon Valdez struck a reef in Alaska's Prince
William Sound in March of 1989, the oil industry and envi-
ronmentalists had been awaiting changes in oil pollution legis-
lation. The Valdez incident caused eleven million gallons of
crude oil to leak into the pristine Alaskan waters, creating the
worst maritime environmental disaster in American history.1
On August 18, 1990, the President signed the Oil Pollution
Act of 19902 (OPA), which had been passed by Congress just
before its summer recess.
I. Other Major Oil Spills
A. Tanker Related Spills
Other major disasters since the Valdez have added impe-
tus to the general outrage for damage done to sensitive envi-
ronmental areas by oil spills. Despite the attention given to
the ecological disaster caused by Iraq in the Persian Gulf, our
own problems have not been forgotten.'
In June 1990, the supertanker, Mega Borg, exploded and
burned in the Gulf of Mexico while transferring some of its 41
million gallon cargo of oil to a smaller ship.4 The blast, in
which two seamen were killed, two others were listed as miss-
ing and presumed dead, and numerous other crew members
were injured, occurred after approximately 3 million gallons of
oil had been transferred.5 Oil leakage created a slick thirty
miles long and eight miles wide off the shore of Galveston,
Texas.' If the remaining 38 million gallons had spilled out, the
spillage would have been more than three times that of the
Exxon Valdez.
1. J. COM., Special Report, Mar. 9, 1990, at 3B.
2. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (1990) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 23, 26, 33, 43, and 46 U.S.C.) [hereinafter OPA].
3. N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1991, at 1, col. 3.
4. Id., June 16, 1990, at 6, col. 4.
5. Id., June 17, 1990, at 18, col. 1.
6. Id., June 22, 1990, at 12, col. 1.
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The details of this incident were dramatic. Fire raged for
over a week, clouds rising to the skies. Attempts to skim the
oil off the water were a minor success, and bacteria were then
placed in the water with the hope that they would decompose
the oil; the result was equally ineffective. The Mega Borg lost
over 4 million gallons of oil, but much of that was burned off
in the fire after the explosion. Response to the incident was
criticized, but five fire boats, six oil skimmers, an aircraft to
apply solvents to disperse the oil, and two work boats with
foam arrived shortly after the fire began. Efforts were made to
put out the fire as expeditiously as possible to prevent the
vessel from sinking, and releasing even more oil into the Gulf.
Miraculously, a repeat of the Exxon Valdez catastrophe was
avoided.7
These disasters pale in comparison to the Amoco Cadiz
incident which spilled 68 million gallons off the coast of
northern France in 1978. The resulting oil slick was approxi-
mately eighteen miles wide and eighty miles long. In June of
1990, a judgment for damages was entered against Amoco for
$160 million dollars.'
New York harbor had its headaches in the spring of 1990.
Since the first of the year, over one million gallons of oil have
been spilled in the busy Kill Van Kull approaches to Port
Newark. One of the five worst spills was due to the grounding
of the tanker B.T. Nautilus, which spilled 260,000 gallons in
the narrow waterway. The B. T. Nautilus' major insurer, Gard,
is a Norwegian protection and indemnity insurer, which pro-
vides $500 million in pollution liability coverage. (Ironically,
Gard also insured the Mega Borg - a bad year!) When the
ship was arrested, Gard posted a $24.7 million guarantee. Al-
though a local ship's pilot was probably at fault, for bringing
the ship into port when the currents were too swift which
pushed the ship out of its proper channel, the ship's captain
7. N.Y. Times, June 13, 1990, at A27, col. 1; N.Y. Times, June 16, 1990, at 6, col.
4; N.Y. Times, June 17, 1990 at 18, col. 1; see generally J. CoM., June 12, 1990; J.
COM., June 14, 1990, at 3B.
8. J. COM., June 20, 1990, at 6B.
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and the first mate were also under investigation.' The captain
of the Port of New York, Captain North, has said that of the
28,000 vessel movements each year in the port of New York,
seventy-five percent use the Arthur Kill and Kill Van Kull
channels located between Staten Island and New Jersey.10
In June 1990, an oil spill off of Cape Cod fouled beaches
in the area when the cruise ship, Bermuda Star, grounded.1
Rhode Island also had a major oil spill when a similar ground-
ing occurred, probably due to acute fatigue on the part of the
master."2
B. Barge Related Spills
A major oil slick in Galveston Bay resulted when a tanker
collided with oil barges in the heavily-traveled Houston-Gal-
veston ship channel in July of 1990.13 However, in this acci-
dent, the oil spill was caused by barges, not by the tanker.
This accident exemplifies the large number of oil spills from
barges in coastal and port waters. In addition, this spill led
observers to note the lack of regulation and inadequate train-
ing of tug and barge crews. Tugs, which guide barges, have not
been subject to Coast Guard inspection. Qualifications for tug
crews and barge crews are much lower than for tanker and
larger vessel crews; in some cases crew qualifications are non-
existent.
In the Houston channel collision, an outbound Greek
tanker (with a double hull) struck an inbound trio of barges,
hitting two and sinking one." The accident occurred when the
view of both the tanker and the barges was temporarily ob-
scured by another ship passing between them in a narrow and
9. N.Y.L.J., Sept. 7, 1990, at 3, col. 2.
10. J. COM., June 15, 1990, at 3B and liB; J. COM., June 25, 1990 at 3B.
11. See J. CoM., June 12, 1990, at 3B.
12. The findings of the National Transportation Safety Board concerning the
Rhode Island spill was reported in the Journal of Commerce on December 19, 1990.
Crew fatigue also figured in the Exxon Valdez spill. See also N.Y. Times, Dec. 18,
1990, at A20, col. 1.
13. See id., July 31, 1990, at A13, col. 1.
14. J. COM., Aug. 6, 1990, at 3B.
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crowded channel.' Some 500,000 gallons of oil spilled from
the barges; one barge partially sank, blocking traffic in the
channel which cuts through the Galveston Bay.' Closing the
channel, among other restrictions, led to an estimated $20
million loss in ship delays and other losses.
II. Prior Legislation
*A. The Clean Water Act
Section 311" of the Clean Water Act (CWA) covers both
oil pollution and pollution by hazardous substances. Under
this provision, restoration cost'8 is the standard measure of
damages for violations.' 9 Superfund, created by the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabil-
ity Act (CERCLA)20 originally covered only hazardous sub-
stances and excluded oil and other forms of petroleum. The
petroleum exclusion of section 9601(33) of CERCLA was rein-
forced in the Superfund Amendments & Reauthorization Act
(SARA), and was confirmed by the EPA. Specifically, section
9614(c) exempted service stations from recovery of any CER-
CLA-based claim where recycled oil was released but con-
tained no other hazardous substance.2'
Damages for injury to natural resources may be recovered
by a state, and in some cases by the federal government, as
trustee.22 A National Contingency Plan (NCP) was set up to
coordinate federal agency responses to oil spills, including
15. N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1990, at A10, col. 2.
16. Id., July 31, 1990, at A13, col. 1.
17. Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, § 311, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1988 &
Supp. V) [hereinafter CWA].
18. Costs for the removal of the oil are mandated in § 311(f)(1)-(3), 33 U.S.C. §
1321(f)(1)-(3); costs for the replacement or restoration of natural resources are found
in § 311(f)(4), (5), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(4), (5).
19. See generally CWA § 311(f), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f).
20. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act §
101, 33 U.S.C. § 9601 (1988 & Supp. V) [hereinafter CERCLA].
21. The July 1987 clarification memo preserves the exemption except where a
specified listing for a petroleum constituent existed in the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act. CERCLA § 114(c), 33 U.S.C. § 9614(c).
22. Id. § 107(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f). See Ohio v. United States Dep't of the
Interior, 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
1990]
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those of the Coast Guard. 3 The CWA provides that when a
spill or discharge occurs, a vessel owner or operator is liable to
the United States up to the greater of $125 per gross ton or
$125,000 for an inland oil barge, and $150 per gross ton or
$250,000 against other vessels.2 Liability under the CWA is
divided into three categories: vessels,26 onshore facilities, 26 and
offshore facilities.27
The CWA also provides for civil penalties of up to $5,000
per spill, with certain assessments being mandatory.2" Civil
actions may be brought to impose a penalty of up to $50,000
for each violation.29 Wilful negligence within the privity and
knowledge of an owner, can result in penalties of $250,000 for
an individual.3 1 Imprisonment is also possible for knowing of-
fenders.31 In some instances, corporate officials may be held
criminally liable. 32
The liability imposed by the CWA is strict and absolute,
except for enumerated defenses, such as an act of God, or an
act of war.33 Other available defenses include negligence on
the part of the United States 3 ' and acts or omissions of a
third party for an inland oil barge or for a vessel which does
not carry oil as a cargo. 36 These defenses apply to all vessel-
23. See 40 C.F.R. Part 300 (1990); see also Natural Oil and Hazardous Sub-
stances Pollution Contingency Plan, 55 Fed. Reg. 8666 (1990).
24. CWA § 311(f), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f).
25. Id. § 311(f)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(1).
26. Id. § 311(f)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(2).
27. Id. § 311(f)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(3).
28. Id. § 311(b)(6)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6)(A).
29. Id. § 311(b)(6)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6)(B); see also In re Exxon Valdez,
No. A89-095 (D. Alaska Feb. 9, 1991).
The decision was certified for an interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit. Those
plaintiffs who could not recover economic damages under maritime tort law can still
claim against a $100 million fund established by the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authori-
zation Act. 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) No. 6 (Feb. 25, 1991).
30. CWA § 311(b)(6)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6)(B).
31. Id. § 309(c)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2).
32. Id. § 309(c)(6), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(6).
33. Id. § 311(f), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f).
34. Id. § 311(f), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f).
35. Id. § 311(f)(1), 33 U.S.C. §1321(f)(1). This defense applies to onshore facili-
ties and offshore facilities as well. Id. § 311(f)(2)-(3), § 1321(f)(2)-(3).
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related discharges. 6
Under the CWA37 and Executive Orders, 8 the govern-
ment is empowered to clean up the spill if the responsible
party refuses. Case law has imposed third party liability for
certain oil spills. For example, a shipowner may be held liable
for the negligence of a compulsory pilot.3 9 A third party which
collides with an oil tanker and is solely responsible for the oil
release from the tanker is also liable for cleanup costs.4 0 The
latter situation also presents a cause of action under the gen-
eral maritime law. When maritime law is invoked, a shipowner
or charterer can assert the defense of limitation of liability.4 '
This defense allows a shipowner or charterer, without mana-
gerial complicity or "privity," to limit damages to the value of
the vessel plus pending freight (the value of the cargo).2
Under such an action, personal injuries or death can then be
claimed against a separate fund based on tonnage. 3 Statutory
authority for such claims is set forth in the Limitation of Lia-
bility Act.4 '
In cases involving inadequate or improper operational
and/or training procedures, management may be implicated
and the privity option will deny limitation of the manage-
ment's liability. 5 Management is deemed to have privity with,
and knowledge of, the operational and/or training procedures
36. Id. § 311(f)(1), § 1321(f)(1). All four defenses are available for onshore and
offshore facilities. Id. § 311(f)(2)-(3), § 1321(f)(2)-(3).
37. Id. § 311(c)(1)-(2), (d), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c)(1)-(2), (d).
38. Exec. Order No. 11,735, 38 Fed. Reg. 21,243 (1973) (as amended by Exec.
Order No. 12,418, 48 Fed. Reg. 20,891 (1983), reprinted in 33 U.S.C. § 1321 app. at
1042-43 (1988)); Exec. Order No. 12,418, 48 Fed. Reg. 20,891 (1983), reprinted in 33
U.S.C. § 1321 app. at 1043-44 (1988 & Supp. V).
39. Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 564 F.2d 964 (1st Cir. 1977); United States v.
Hollywood Marind, Inc., 625 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1980) (tug boat is not a third party if
a barge it is towing leaks oil).
40. United States v. MAT Big Sam, 681 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1982) (there may also
be liability for a maritime tort, but this liability may be limited by the Limitation of
Liability Act).
41. Id. at 443; Farrell Lines, Inc. v. Jones, 530 F.2d 7 (5th Cir. 1976).
42. Farrell Lines, 530 F.2d at 10.
43. See Kroemer v. Engliehno, No. 89-7230 (2d Cir. filed Feb. 23, 1990).
44. 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1988).
45. See, e.g., Farrell Lines, 530 F.2d at 10-12; Hercules Carriers, Inc. v. Florida,
768 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1985).
1990]
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of its crews, which also results in the denial of limitation of
liability where there are inaccurate charts or navigational
aids.46 This option is different from simple navigation error
which will usually allow limitation of liability.4 7
The limitation of the liability of the shipowner may also
be precluded if there is a known or obvious incompetence of
officers or crew members."" In these cases, the burden is on
the shipowner to show crew competence, or that crew incom-
petence did not cause the accident.4 9 If the shipowner dele-
gates authority for hiring, the owner must still take steps to
ensure the competence of the crew. 0
If both the discharging vessel and another vessel are lia-
ble for the accident, the discharging vessel alone is held re-
sponsible for all the cleanup costs." However, the CWA does
provide a right of contribution against the other vessel.52 Even
if the other vessel does not create the discharge, the govern-
ment may bring an action against it for negligence as a mari-
time tort."3 In these cases, defenses may be limited to those
allowed by the Limitation'of Liability Act.14 Wilful miscon-
duct or wilful negligence combined with managerial privity
voids the penalty assessment limitations of both the CWA and
Superfund 5
46. See Farrell Lines, 530 F.2d at 7; Hercules Carriers, 768 F.2d at 1558; Com-
plaint of Chevron Transport Corp., 613 F. Supp. 1428 (D.C. Fla. 1985), aff'd, 832 F.2d
1540 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1033 (1988).
47. Hercules Carriers, 768 F.2d at 1558.
48. Hercules Carriers, 768 F.2d at 1558; In re Ta Chi Navigation (Panama)
Corp., 513 F. Supp. at 148 (E.D. La. 1981).
49. Hercules Carriers, 768 F.2d at 1564; In re Ta Chi, 513 F. Supp. at 148.
50. CWA § 311(f), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f) (1988).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See 46 U.S.C. § 2302 (1988).
54. Limited Liability Act, ch. 13, 9 Stat. 635 (Mar. 3, 1951) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 46 U.S.C.).
55. Wilful misconduct with managerial privity was found in Tug Ocean Prince v.
United States, 584 F.2d 1151 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 959 (1979). See 33
U.S.C. § 1321(f) and 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(2). Only negligence was found in Steuart
Trans. Co. v. Allied Towing Corp., 596 F.2d 609 (4th Cir. 1979).
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B. Actions for Damage to Natural Resources
In addition to the CWA, several other acts entitle the fed-
eral and state governments to recover damages to restore or
replace damaged natural resources. 6 Some states have legisla-
tion and case law that allow the state to sue as a trustee of its
citizens.57
In Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. The S.S. Zoe Coloco-
troni," the court held that the measure of damages recover-
able under state law was limited to the cost of restoration over
time, so as not to be disproportionate to damages, rather than
the diminution of the commercial value of the area damaged
or for immediate and expensive "draconian" restoration.5'
The court ruled that, as a private landowner, the Common-
wealth could recover for private economic loss." However, the
court awarded these damages to the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico as a private landowner notwithstanding the fact that the
suit was brought under a statute of the Commonwealth of Pu-
erto Rico for protection of land and wildlife by a governmen-
tal agency.6 1
One of the issues involved with the Valdez incident was
whether the rule of the United States Department of the Inte-
rior, which had been attacked in the S.S. Zoe Colocotroni'2
case, would apply to damage in Prince William Sound. Envi-
ronmentalists and members of Congress have sought to ensure
that assigning dollar values to natural resources to determine
environmental damage will not be the basis for claims against
Exxon. According to one Interior Department official, these
56. See, e.g., CERCLA § 111(i), 42 U.S.C. § 9611(i); Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1813(b)(3) (1988); Deepwater Port Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1517(d)
(1988); Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1653(a)(1) (1988).
57. See Maine v. M/V Tamano, 357 F. Supp. 1097 (D.C. Me. 1973); In re Steuart
Trans., 495 F. Supp. 38 (D.C. Va. 1980).
58. 628 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1980). This case has a good discussion of the scope of
the Clean Water Act's 1977 amendments and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
Amendments of 1978.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See id.
19901
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rules would not apply to Valdez damages. 3 Under the new
legislation, damage to natural resources is an important
provision.
C. International Protocols
Recent congressional hearings considered adherence by
the United States to the International Protocols of 1984 to the
International Conventions on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage of 1969,64 and for the Establishment of An Interna-
tional Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage of
1971 (the Fund). 5 The Fund, which had a maximum of 135
million Special Drawing Rights in 1984,6 was designed to pro-
vide additional compensation for victims of large scale oil pol-
lution that were insufficiently covered by the 1969 Conven-
tion." The Fund is financed through contributions by persons
in a contracting state who receive significant oil cargoes.6 8
Drafters of the OPA decided against adherence to these inter-
national protocols.
In 1975, the United States ratified one convention dealing
with oil pollution on the high seas.6 9 The United States rati-
fied the Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships (MARPOL) in 1980, and passed implementing legisla-
tion soon thereafter. Besides setting standards in construction
and ship equipment, the Coast Guard was given broad powers
to protect the marine environment.7 0 Even before passage of
63. 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 485 (June 30, 1989).
64. Protocol of 1984 to Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability
for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969 [hereinafter Civil Liability Convention], reprinted in
23 I.L.M. 177 (1984).
65. Protocol of 1984 to Amend the International Convention on the Establish-
ment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage [hereinaf-
ter 1971 Fund Convention], reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 195 (1984).
66. Civil Liability Convention, supra note 64, at art. VI, reprinted in 15 J. MAR.
L. & COMM. 613, 616 (1984).
67. 1971 Fund Convention, Arts. 2-4, reprinted in 11 I.L.M at 284-87 (1972).
68. Id. arts. 10-12; 11 I.L.M at 290-93 (1972).
69. International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases
of Oil Pollution Casualties, November 29, 1969, Brussels, entered into force for
United States, May 6, 1975, 26 U.S.T. 765, T.I.A.S. No. 8068.
70. See Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1912 (1988).
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the OPA, the United States and various states had enacted
laws which were not completely in harmony with the proposed
international protocols.
The 1969 Civil Liability Convention (CLC) provides a
maximum liability of approximately $17 million, under cur-
rent values 7 1 and allows for damages to private parties as well
as government cleanup costs.7" However, only the owner is lia-
ble under the CLC.7 ' The 1971 Fund substantially increased
the CLC amount to $80 million .7 If all provisions of the 1984
protocols were in force (which would assume adherence by na-
tions of the major oil importers) up to about $264 million
would be available, including money from the Fund and
amounts available under the CLC in certain cases.
The Maritime Law Association (MLA) has long sup-
ported the ratification of the proposed conventions to increase
international uniformity by the United States and to do away
with the hodgepodge of conflicting federal and state laws.75 In
the 1984 protocols, "pollution damage" was defined to include
''economic loss," and the cost of preventive measures; an "in-
cident" was defined as an occurrence not only causing dam-
71. CIVIL LIABILITY CONVENTION, supra note 67, at art. V; 9 I.L.M 45, 48 (1970).
The convention provided for a maximum liability of $210 million. See generally J.
CoM., June 14, 1990.
72. The decision of District Court Judge McGarr in the Amoco Cadiz litigation
dealt with this Convention. Since not ratified by the U.S., the Convention was held
inapplicable in the U.S. court. Even under French law including the Convention, the
judge held that victims can sue in tort outside of the Convention against anyone
other than the registered owner, its agents, or its servants (i.e., master or crew). In re
Oil Spill By "Amoco Cadiz," 1984 A.M.C. 2123 (D.C. I11. 1984). This decision is a
brilliant dissertation on oil spill cases. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana and two of its
subsidiaries were held liable for the spill. Claimants included fishermen, hotel owners,
a region in Brittany, France and the owner of the oil cargo. Amoco Transport was to
arbitrate its claim against the salvage company for its claimed negligence. The Amoco
parties were given the right to recover over and against the Spanish builders. Id.
73. Civil Liability Convention, supra note 67, at art. V.
74. TOVALOP and CRISTAL, A Guide to Oil Spill Compensation, N.Y. Times,
June 29, 1990, at Al, col. 3 [hereinafter TOVALOP and CRISTAL].
75. M.L.A. minutes of the May 4, 1984, Annual Meeting, cited in Paulsen, Why
the United States Should Ratify the 1984 Protocols to the International Conven-
tions on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (1969) and the Establishment of an
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (1971), 20 FORUM
164, 168-69 (1984-85).
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age, but one which caused a grave and imminent or serious
threat of damage. 6
A major problem in drafting the OPA was whether the
United States should ratify the international conventions.7 7
Many legislators felt that the protocols would provide less
coverage than the pending legislation, and would also limit
state liability claims.7' The recent legislation was enacted with
full knowledge that the new Act made adherence to the inter-
national protocols impossible.7 9 International insurers are dis-
appointed that Congress has more draconian proposals than
were agreed to in the protocols. The protocols would also
override any inconsistent state legislation. When the Presi-
dent signed the new bill, he chastised Congress for refusing to
endorse the international protocols which would have pro-
vided access to a maximum of $260 million from the interna-
tional Fund under the 1984 Protocols.8 0
In addition to the convention funding, there are private
agreements which provide substantial funds for oil pollution
damage. The Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement Concern-
ing Liability for Oil Pollution (TOVALOP), a voluntary agree-
ment of tanker owners, provides funds of up to $16.8 mil-
lion. 1 The Contract Regarding Interim Supplement to Tanker
Liability for Oil Pollution (CRISTAL), which includes oil
cargo interests, provides for funds of up to $135 million, in-
cluding TOVALOP money.2 These funds may be obtained
through well-defined claims procedures.8 One large oil spill
off of France was successfully resolved under the claims proce-
dures.84 Under the OPA, one provision states that the United
States favors participation in the international conventions,
76. Civil Liability Convention, supra note 64, at art. II, para. 3, reprinted in 15
J. MAR. L. COMM. 613 (1984).
77. See J. COM., June 29, 1990; J. COM., July 24, 1990; J. COM., Oct. 22, 1990.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. N.Y. Times, June 29, 1990, at Al, col. 3; J. COM., Aug. 21, 1990, at lB.
81. TOVALOP and CRISTAL, supra note 74.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Address by Christopher B. Kende, International Law Association (Nov. 2,
1990).
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but only if the conventions are as effective as the provisions of
the OPA, including federal and state laws."'
III. The New Legislation
A. The Oil Pollution and Control Act of 1990
The OPA, which took fifteen years to create, increases the
cap on spiller liability eight-fold to $10 million or $1,200 per
ton, whichever is greater. 6 There is no limitation of liability
in cases of gross negligence, wilful misconduct, or violations of
federal operating and safety standards under the OPA.8 7 The
OPA requires that incidents be reported or liability limita-
tions will fail.88 It also holds "bareboat charterers" 89 of oil re-
sponsible for damages, as well as vessel owners and
operators.9 0
The elements of liability and damages under the OPA are
most important:
1. Removal costs incurred by the United States and others
must be consistent with the new National Contingency Plan;91
2. A United States trustee or other enumerated trustees, in-
cluding a foreign trustee, may recover for damage to natural
resources; 2
3. Recovery is permitted for injury, including economic losses
from destruction of real or personal property 3 (this ensures
collection of losses generally excluded in other areas of mari-
time law by prior court decisions);
4. Damages include those for loss of subsistence use of natural
85. OPA, Pub. L. No. 101-380, § 3001, 104 Stat. 484, 507-08 (1990).
86. Id. § 1004(a), 104 Stat. 484, 491-92 (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2704).
87. Id. § 1004(c)(1), 104 Stat. 484, 492 (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2704).
88. Id. § 1004(c)(2)(A), 104 Stat. 484, 492 (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2704).
89. A bareboat or demise charterer leases and operates the vessel and employs
its own crew. See International Marine Towing, Inc. v. Southern Leasing Partners,
Ltd., 722 F.2d 126 (5th Cir. 1983).
90. OPA, Pub. L. No. 101-380, § 2002, 104 Stat. 484, 507 (to be codified at 33
U.S.C. § 1321).
91. Id. § 1002(b)(1)(A), (B), 104 Stat. 484, 489 (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. §
2702).
92. Id. § 1002(b)(2)(A), 104 Stat. 484, 489-90 (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2702).
93. Id. § 1002(b)(2)(B), 104 Stat. 484, 490 (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2702).
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resources, even though not owned; 94
5. Damages for net loss of taxes, royalties, rents, fees, or net
profit due to injury to property, recoverable by the United
States, a state, or political subdivision;95
6. Loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity due to
injury to property or natural resources, recoverable by any
claimant;96
7. Damage for net costs of providing increased or additional
public services caused by oil discharges, recoverable by a state
or subdivision29
Defenses include acts of God, war, or a third party.' 8
However, no defense is permitted for the acts of a third party
which had contracted with the responsible party.9 9 Thus, pol-
lution caused by a barge towed by a tug would not relieve the
barge owner from liability because the tug was at fault or by
claiming that the pilot was at fault. A claimant would also be
denied recovery if the incident was caused by the claimant's
own gross negligence or willful misconduct. 100
Liability limits are set as follows under the OPA:
1. Tank vessels have a liability limit of $1,200 per gross ton or
if larger than 3000 gross tons, $10 million, whichever is
greater. For vessels of 3,000 gross tons or less, the outside fig-
ure is $2 million. Other vessels are liable for $600 per ton or
$500,000, whichever is greater; 10 1
2. Onshore facilities and deep water ports are liable for re-
moval costs plus $350 million;10
3. Offshore facilities are liable for removal costs plus $75
million. 10 3
There are also provisions for the recovery of damages
94. Id. § 1002(b)(2)(C).
95. Id. § 1002(b)(2)(D).
96. Id. § 1002(b)(2)(E).
97. Id. § 1002(b)(2)(F).
98. Id. § 1003(a)(1)-(3), 104 Stat. 484, 491 (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2703).
99. Id. § 1003(a)(3).
100. Id. § 1003(b).
101. Id. § 1004(a)(1)(A), (B) & (a)(2), 104 Stat. 484, 491-92 (to be codified at 33
U.S.C. § 2704).
102. Id. § 1004(a)(4), 104 Stat. 484, 492 (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2704).
103. Id. § 1004(a)(3).
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where foreign claimants are involved. 104 For example, a vessel
carrying oil as cargo between two places in the United States,
which damages foreign interests, is liable for the foreign en-
tity's removal costs and damages. 0 5 However, the OPA re-
quires that the foreign country involved must provide a com-
parable remedy for American claimants.'
Penalties for violations of the OPA include up to three
years imprisonment and fines of up to $250,000 for an individ-
ual or $500,000 for an organization for failure to report a
spill. 0 7 Civil penalties are assessed at $25,000 per day or
$1,000 per barrel of oil for a violation.10 8 The minimum pen-
alty is $100,000 in cases of gross negligence, but no more than
$3,000 a barrel. 09 Despite some controversy over the dangers
as well as the effectiveness of a double hull on a tanker, the
OPA requires double hulls for tankers entering American
ports by the year 2010 with the phase-out schedule beginning
in 1995.110
A federal fund of $1 billion has been established for spill
cleanup costs and economic compensation."' The money
comes from a five cent per barrel fee on both domestic and
imported oil. Assets in the fund, would be available for
cleanup costs when liability limits are met, as well as for pay-
ment for economic damages." 2 Funds are also available if the
spiller cannot be found, or when a spiller and injured party
cannot settle on damages within ninety days.111
104. Id. § 1004(a)(4).
105. Id. § 1007(b)(3), 104 Stat 484, 497 (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2707).
106. Id. § 1007(a)(1)(B).
107. Id. § 4301(a)(2), 104 Stat. 484, 533 (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5)).
108. Id. § 4301(b)(7)(A), 104 Stat. 484, 536 (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. §
1321(b)).
109. Id. § 4301(b)(7)(D), 104 Stat. 484, 537 (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. §
1321(b)).
110. Id. § 4115(c)(3)(A)(i), 104 Stat. 484, 518 (to be codified at 46 U.S.C. §
3703(a)).
111. Id. § 9001(d)(1), 104 Stat. 484, 574 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 9509).
112. Id. § 1013(d), 104 Stat. 484, 501 (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2713).
113. Id. § 1013(c)(1), (2).
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B. State Activities
States are permitted to enact laws that are even more
stringent than federal regulations for oil spills. The Supreme
Court has ruled that federal statutes have not preempted
state oil pollution statutes. 114 Twenty-four states have some
form of legislation dealing with rights of compensation due to
oil spills, or liability for cleanup costs. As of August 1990, sev-
enteen states had no liability limits. Since the Exxon Valdez
incident, Alaska has had approximately 200 new bills under
consideration. New York, New Jersey, Maine, and Florida all
have significant anti-pollution statutes."'
Florida and Louisiana assess incoming oil products to fi-
nance a spill-cleanup fund.' In August, Texas authorities
proposed a fee between one cent and ten cents on a barrel on
incoming oil products to finance a Gulf Coast interstate oil-
spill response cleanup fund."" An interstate body would be
set up to administer the project, coordinate clean up efforts,
and even set safety standards for tankers and personnel oper-
ating in the Gulf.
In September 1990, following the change in federal law,
California passed a stringent law regulating prevention pro-
grams and oil response. The program was placed under the
state Resources Agency. Provisions include a $100 million
emergency response fund and unlimited state borrowing au-
thority for cleanups, funded by the oil industry." 8 Revenues
are raised for the fund by taxing oil at twenty-five cents per
gallon. An oil spill administrator, empowered to coordinate
114. Askew v. American Waterway Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973). The
Court held that where no clear-cut conflict existed under the predecessor legislation
to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, the state law would
have effect. Admiralty law under the Admiralty Extension Act, 46 U.S.C. § 740
(1988), was also implicated. Some 10 states hold shippers liable, a provision rejected
in the 1990 Act. See J. COM., Feb. 13, 1991.
115. See, e.g., N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW §§ 170-197 (McKinney 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 48:13A-12 (West 1990). ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 541-57 (Supp. 1973); FLA.
STAT. §§ 376.011-21 (1970). New Jersey has fines up to 10 million dollars. See J. COM.,
July 24, 1990.
116. See J. CoM., June 21, 1990.
117. See J. COM., Aug. 13, 1990.
118. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8670.48 (West 1980 & Supp. 1991).
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prevention and cleanup efforts, is established under the law."1 '
It is expected that this administrator will head a new office of
Spill Preparedness, combining the powers of fourteen state
agencies. 120
The California statute provides stringent cease and desist
authority to enforce spill prevention measures. Strict tanker
inspection and safety programs are authorized, which include
tanker inspection and safety programs;121 radar controls are
set up for tanker traffic along the California coast;1 22 the state
has the authority to conduct surprise inspections of tankers
and terminals;2 3 refineries are required to have safety
plans. 2' The law provides for sixty-day limited immunity
plans after a spill, with a thirty-day extension to maximize the
best possible response to large spills, while requiring responsi-
ble parties to indemnify for the cleanup.1
25
New York legislation, similar to that of California, autho-
rizes the Commissioner of Environmental Conservation to es-
tablish standards covering petroleum shipments, to set mini-
mum vessel standards for ships in New York waters, and to
set tanker-free zones.'2 6 Virginia and the state of Washington
are considering similar legislation.
C. Planning and Response Provisions
A new era of spill prevention is also part of the OPA. One
provision requires tanker operators to participate in the Coast
Guard's vessel monitoring and tracking system, known as Ves-
sel Traffic Service (VTS). 27 Before passage of the OPA, par-
ticipation in this type of system was voluntary. The Exxon
Valdez catastrophe might have been avoided if VTS had been
119. Id. § 8670.4.
120. N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1990, at 26, col. 4.
121. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8670.18.
122. Id. § 8670.21(a).
123. Id. § 8670.18.
124. Id. § 8670.17.
125. Id. § 8670.56.6(c)(1).
126. J. COM., July 5, 1990, at 4B.
127. OPA, Pub. L. No. 101-380, § 4107, 104 Stat. 484, 514 (to be codified at 33
U.S.C. § 1223(a)); J. COM., Aug. 9, 1990, at 3B.
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operative in Prince William Sound in March of 1989. The Na-
tional Transportation Safety Board concluded that one of the
major causes of the disaster was the lack of an effectively
equipped and adequately manned VTS system. 128 In light of
its effectiveness, funds are budgeted to re-establish proper
VTS systems in New Orleans and in New York harbor.12 Re-
cent reports indicate the Coast Guard is reinstating radar, a
video camera system, and a VTS system on Governors Island
in New York harbor.130
The United States Secretary of Transportation deter-
mines which ports and channels will have the VTS system.
Priorities are established based on the risks in each area and
volume of traffic. A similar nationwide planning and response
system is established under the OPA.' 31 The OPA also pro-
vides for a national response unit and ten regional response
groups that will list the available spill removal resources,
equipment, and personnel. 32 Under the system provided for
in the OPA, the private sector supplies the bulk of equipment
and personnel needed. Demonstration projects are authorized
for three areas: New York/New Jersey, Los Angeles/Long
Beach, and New Orleans. Each of the port areas will get as
much as $750,000 a year for four years, beginning in 1992, for
the testing of cleanup techniques and response procedures.'33
These measures are reactive to inefficient oil spill responses,
such as the Mega Borg accident, where fire fighting teams
took two days to arrive at the scene, and much of the equip-
ment had to be brought in from overseas.'3
The OPA requires owners and operators of oil vessels and
oil facilities to submit oil spill response plans within thirty
months. 35 As a consequence of the OPA, the oil industry has
128. N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1990, at A10, col. 1; J. COM., Aug. 2, 1990, at 8B.
129. J. COM., Aug. 9, 1990, at 3B; See J. COM., Dec. 6, 1990, at 8B.
130. J. COM., Dec. 5, 1990, at 8B; J. COM., Dec. 6, 1990, at 8B.
131. See OPA, Pub. L. No. 101-380, § 4202, 104 Stat. 484, 537-32 (to be codified
at 33 U.S.C. § 1321).
132. Id. § 4202(b)(2), 104 Stat. 484, 531-32 (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1321).
See also Federal Water Pollution Control Act, § 3116)(2), 33 U.S.C. 132f(j)(2) (1988).
133. See J. COM., Aug. 9, 1990.
134. N.Y. Times, June 13, 1990, at A26, col. 1.
135. See OPA, Pub. L. No. 101-380, § 4202, 104 Stat. 484, 527-32 (to be codified
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set up a new industry pollution response organization. Some
twenty major oil companies are funding the Marine Spill Re-
sponse Corporation (MSRC), formerly the Petroleum Indus-
try Response Organization. The MSRC will spend about $800
million over the next five years to set up five regional centers
and twenty-three equipment staging areas at the major port
regions.1 36 The cost is to cover spill equipment, maintenance,
research, and personnel. Ten specialized spill response vessels
will be built and other spill response companies will be in-
cluded. The MSRC is expected to be fully operational by the
beginning of 1993. In early 1991, a former head of the EPA
was named chairman along with eight other board
members.137
The Marine Preservation Association is to be the funding
arm for the MSRC. The OPA requires petroleum companies
to designate a cleanup organization and a response corpora-
tion to act as the designated party.138 Dues must be paid on
the basis of oil taken into the United States or transported
within the country. 139 A research program is also contem-
plated. Regional centers cover New York, Florida, Louisiana,
the Los Angeles area, and Seattle, with proposed sites to cover
most of the major coastal and Gulf ports, and Alaska.
A revision is to be made with respect to the Coast
Guard's program for issuing, renewing, suspending or revoking
mariner licenses. The Coast Guard is to have access to the
National Driver Register for the information on driving viola-
tions for applicants for Coast Guard licenses.' 0 Captain Ha-
zelwood of the Exxon Valdez had been convicted twice of
charges involving drunk driving for which his driver's license
had been suspended or revoked three times.""
at 33 U.S.C. § 1321).
136. J. COM., Sept. 7, 1990, at lB.
137. J. COM., Feb. 1, 1991, at 3B. A president and other officers were appointed in
December 1990. See J. COM., Dec. 18, 1990.
138. See OPA, Pub. L. No. 101-380, § 4202, 104 Stat. 484, 527-32 (to be codified
at 33 U.S.C. § 1321).
139. J. CoM., Sept. 7, 1990, at 1A.
140. See OPA, Pub. L. No. 101-380, § 4105, 104 Stat. 484, 512 (to be codified at
23 U.S.C. § 401).
141. N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1990, at 26, col. 4. For an informative article on the
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Manning requirements are mandated by the OPA: officers
and crews may not work more than fifteen hours in any
twenty-four hour period and not more than thirty-six hours in
any seventy-two hour period.1" 2 These requirements will have
an impact on the size of ships' crews.
IV. Problems for the Future
A. Limits on Insurance Coverage
The Mega Borg was insured for $500 million in oil pollu-
tion liability coverage by Gard.1"" When the ship was arrested
to assure payment, Gard posted a guarantee.1 4 4 Exxon is said
to have spent in the area of $2 billion in clean up costs by the
end of 1989, not including the 1990 seasonal activities. 1 5 In
the summer of 1990, Exxon had a second season of cleanup. 46
There is some improvement in the environmental health of
the area, but oil can remain in some areas for a decade before
decaying.
One of the issues that came up in the Exxon civil suits is
who may recover damages.1 47 In February 1991, a federal
judge in Alaska held that only those who suffered direct eco-
nomic losses could recover.14 8 Commercial fishermen could re-
cover, but not sport fishermen, fish processors, boat charter-
ers, and some other groups.1 9
spill, see Behar, Joe's Bad Trip, TIME, July 24, 1989, at 42.
142. OPA, Pub. L. No. 101-380, § 4114, 104 Stat. 484, 517 (to be codified at 46
U.S.C. § 8104(n)).
143. N.Y. Times, June 12, 1990, at A19, col. 1. Additional coverage of $200 mil-
lion was also available.
144. See J. COM., June 20, 1990.
145. N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1991, at A12, col. 5.
146. See J. COM., Mar. 14, 1991.
147. In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-095 (D. Alaska Feb. 9, 1991). The judge appar-
ently relied on an older admiralty decision, Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint,
275 U.S. 303 (1927). Other cases have provided for recoveries by commercial fisher-
men for lost profits. Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974); Louisiana
(Guste) v. M/V Testbank, 524 F. Supp. 1170 (E.D. La. 1981). In addition to private
claims, reports in February 1991 noted the prospect of a $1 billion settlement by
Exxon with the U.S. and Alaska with payments over eight years. J. CoM., Feb. 15,
1991, at 7B.
148. In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-095 (D. Alaska Feb. 9, 1991).
149. Id.
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Due to large exposure under the new Act, protection and
indemnity insurers may place such limits on coverage that
whole new insurance coverages may be required. Insurers of
vessels coming to the United States may throw the whole in-
dustry into a crisis. As of February 1991, additional insurance
premiums were assessed for tankers calling in the United
States from ten to twenty percent over the prior year.' 5
B. New Tanker Requirements
Under the new bill, new tankers and barges over 5,000
tons operating in U.S. waters will require double hulls. Single-
hulled tankers, now the usual configuration, must be retrofit-
ted or phased out within twenty years from 1995 to 2010.151
Barges are to be double-hulled by the year 2015.152 A Coast
Guard study has shown definite decreases in spillage where
tankers had double hulls.' 53 They obviously limit the loss if a
tanker is grounded. Even though the double hull would not
have prevented some spillage from the Exxon Valdez, some
studies say that the spill would have been significantly less.154
Some dangers from double hulls have been spoken about.
Water can rush in between a ruptured hull and the inner hull
causing the ship to settle lower, possibly exacerbating the
leak. There is also talk of possible explosive vapors gathering
between the hulls. Costs are also significant. A double hull on
the Exxon Valdez, which cost $125 million to build, would
amount to ten to fifteen percent more to build.' 55 Retrofitting
the 153 tankers in the United States could cost about $30 mil-
lion each at a total cost of over $4 billion.' 6 So far, various
major oil companies have ordered new tankers with double
hulls including Conoco, which has already ordered two such
150. J. COM., Feb. 20, 1991, at 1A.
151. OPA, Pub. L. No. 101-380, § 4115, 104 Stat. 484, 517-22 (to be codified at 46
U.S.C. § 3703(a)).
152. Id.
153. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1990, at D8, col. 3; J. Com., Aug. 9, 1990, at 3B.
154. Actually, the spill would have been approximately 25% to 60% less. N.Y.
Times, Apr. 11, 1990, at D8, col. 3.
155. N.Y. Times, June 17, 1990, at 18, col. 1.
156. Id.; N.Y. Times, July 9, 1990, at A16, col. 5.
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tankers. Statoil of Norway, also reported that it was ordering
five new tankers, two with double hulls and three with double
or partial double bottoms.15
Some legislators will be pressing in the future to require
double-hulls on barges under 5,000 tons. In December 1990,
the Coast Guard published its proposals on the technical
specifications for double hull-designs. 15 8 One suggestion is a
two foot separation between a cargo tank and the outer skin
of the ship. Comments are due in April 1991. A marine board
panel of the National Academy of Sciences is also expected to
deal with the tanker design.1 59
C. Will Tankers Avoid U.S. Ports?
Another worry is whether, despite insurance coverage,
major oil suppliers will stop coming to the ports of the United
States. We may face a rash of small companies, with older
tankers and without adequate insurance, carrying the major
part of the vast oil imports into the United States. When the
Middle East crisis blew up, it was shown that almost half of
the oil products consumed in the United States came from
abroad, most of which would be delivered by ship. Shell has
said that it will only visit the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port even
though its tankers are insured for $1 billion. 160 France's Elf
Aquitaine will no longer send its tankers here, and Maersk, a
major Danish company, announced a similar policy.16 ' British
Petroleum, Petrofina, A.P. Moller, Tee Kay, Bouchard Trans-
portation, and Texaco have expressed reservations on sending
ships to waters of the United States or to certain states. The
fear is the large liability limits and the possibility of unlimited
liability under both federal and state law.
157. N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1990, at D8, col. 2; J. CoM., Aug. 9, 1990, at 3B.
158. J. COM., Dec. 11, 1990, at 1B; See J. COM., Aug. 6, 1990, at 3B.
159. J. COM., Dec. 11, 1990, at lB.
160. J. COM., June 12, 1990, at 9A; J. COM., June 14, 1990, at 8B.
161. J. COM., June 25, 1990, at 8B.
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